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Abstract  
What does children’s play look like in the smart toy era? What conceptual frameworks 
help make sense of the changing practices of children’s connected play worlds? 
Responding to these questions, this article re-frames discussions about children’s smart 
toy play within wider theoretical debates about the affordances of new digital 
materialities. To understand recent transformations of children’s play practices, we 
propose it is necessary to think of toys as being increasingly media-like in their 
affordances and as having intricate connections to wider digital material ecosystems. To 
demonstrate the potential of this conceptual approach, we explore illustrative examples of 
two popular smart ‘care toys’. Our analysis identifies three examples of affordances that 
smart care toys share with other forms of mobile and robotic media: liveliness, affective 
stickiness and portability. We argue that locating discussions of smart toys within wider 
conceptual debates about digital materialities can provide new insights into the changing 
landscape of children’s play.    
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Introduction 
 
The rise of the smart toy has brought talking dolls, interactive pets and programmable 
robots into Western children’s play worlds. Smart toy manufacturers boast their products 
– equipped with features such as sensors, speech-recognition and network connectivity –
offer new interactive and personalised play experiences. Hasbro’s Furby Connect, for 
example, is an animatronic smart toy with built-in sensors that can be programmed to 
respond to a user’s voice and its environment. The Furby Connect is described by Hasbro 
as a toy that encourages ‘phygital play’ – a blend of ‘physical’ and ‘digital’ play (Habsro 
2018). Smart toys have also become subject to increasing research interest. In Europe, 
North America and Australia, research into smart toys has focused on data privacy and 
security (see among others FOSI and FPF, 2016; Montgomery, 2015) and toys in 
computing education (Manches & Plowman 2017; Öztürk & Calingasan 2018).  
This paper contributes to this growing research field by proposing new ways of 
theorising the smart toy in children’s play worlds. Smart toys have significantly 
transformed how children and toys interact, giving rise to new forms of play that blur 
boundaries between the material and digital. Though smart toys continue to share many 
similar traits with traditional toys, often building on existing play categories such as ‘care 
toys’ and ‘construction toys’, we argue that they also increasingly share characteristics 
with domestic media and computing devices. Toys-to-life (TTL) products, for example, 
enable communication between toys and other computing devices such as games 
consoles and tablets. The Skylanders TTL franchise uses NFC (Near Field 
Communication) technology to share information stored on a toy figurine’s microchip 
with that character’s virtual counterpart in the console game. Smart toys can also emulate 
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the traits of other media devices. For example, as we show later, electronic care toys such 
as Furbies can encourage and demand attention like mobile phones. As Mascheroni & 
Holloway (forthcoming) argue, the smart toy increasingly needs to be understood as a 
digital-material object that transcends boundaries between toy and media technology. We 
therefore need new ways to talk about and theorise these smart toys as children’s play 
objects.  
This paper is a theory building piece that looks to media studies, human-computer 
interaction (HCI), and science and technology studies (STS) for new ways to 
conceptualise the smart toy as a media and computing object. We particularly look at two 
concepts: ‘affordances’ (Hutchby, 2001), which has broadly been defined as the 
possibilities for action that arise through interactions between people and objects, and 
‘digital materialities’ (Pink et al, 2016), which has been coined to describe the enmeshing 
of digital and material worlds. The mobile phone is a good example of a digital material 
object – as something that digitally communicates with other devices via the internet, 
Bluetooth and NFC, whilst also being a material device that can be touched and held. To 
understand how smart toys are transforming play practices, we focus on the digital 
material affordances that emerge through the interactions of children and toys and locate 
them in wider media ecosystems. This paper identifies three examples of smart toy 
affordances (liveliness; affective stickiness and mobility) and, borrowing concepts from 
literature across media studies, HCI and STS, we demonstrate how different research 
fields can help to make sense of the digital material affordances that are emerging 
through the interactions of children and smart toys.   
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Our analysis demonstrates that bringing theories and concepts from media studies, 
HCI and STS to bear on smart toy can be highly generative, and we arrive at two 
principal findings: firstly, that smart toys are part of an ‘environment of affordances’ 
(Madianou and Miller 2012) shared with mobile, smart and robotic media. We show how 
recognising smart toys as hybrids of toys and media technologies opens new possibilities 
for observing the similar affordances and characteristics that smart toys share with other 
media, and that this can help extend understanding of these affordances in the context of 
smart toys. Secondly, we find that the smart toy represents a turning point in definitions 
of what counts as a toy – sharing some continuities with traditional toys, whilst also 
creating a new kind of object that requires different conceptual tools that transcend 
traditional field boundaries.    
This article aims to contribute to multiple interdisciplinary fields. It is intended to 
contribute to with the field of toys and digital play, in that it reframes notions such as 
imaginative play and connected play through the lens of digital materialities, as an 
alternate and more productive approach to overcome the duality between the digital and 
non-digital, the online and offline, the material and immaterial. It is also meant to engage 
the field of affordance studies and takes smart toys as a further evidence of how 
affordances should be understood as processual, relational and contingent. Finally, it is 
intended to contribute to media studies, and especially to mediatization research, in that it 
explores the continuities and discontinuities in the practice of play, rather than the 
novelty of the technological features of new smart toys.  
In this paper we focus specifically on a sub-set of the smart toy market: the smart 
care toy. During the 1990s, the Tamagotchi launched as the first popular example of a 
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smart entertainment toy that ‘lived’ through its interaction with users, and combined 
material mobility with situated practices of digital care and nurturing. Broadly, care toys 
can be defined as objects that incite children to engage in the nurturing of an electronic 
pet by feeding, watering, stroking, petting, conversing, playing, teaching, chastising or 
praising. These pets may be screen-based or animatronic. Smart toys are not necessarily 
connected to the Internet, as much as connected toys are not necessarily ‘smart’ – that is 
interactive and responsive to input of various kinds (touch, voice commands, movements 
etc.) We focus on two iterations of the smart care toy: the Tamagotchi (from the 1990s) 
and the Furby (from 1990s-2010s). This article won’t undertake detailed consumer 
histories of either objects, as these have already been comprehensively undertaken 
elsewhere: for the Tamagotchi see Bloch and Lemish (1997) and for the Furby see Marsh 
(2017).   
In the following sections we set the scene for current debates in digital material 
play and theories of affordances, identifying the need for new conceptual relationships 
across fields concerned with media, technology and toys. Our focus then turns to the 
specific example of smart care toys from the 1990s to the 2010s, examining how they 
provide an opportunity for conceptual synthesis around the notion of affordances, 
illustrated through the analysis of empirical material. This paper makes use of material 
from recent studies of smart toys and connected play, including data drawn from research 
conducted by one of the authors in the UK (Thomson, Berriman & Bragg 2018)1. The 
purpose of using these data is to provide illustrative examples of how concepts from 
different fields of research may contribute to and broaden discussion of affordances in 
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smart toys research. We also draw on examples from other papers, including Marsh 
(forthcoming), to further elaborate these points. 
 
Digital materialities of children’s play 
 
The rise of smart toys has prompted new theorisations of the materiality of children’s 
play (Marsh, 2017; Thrift, 2003). This paper contributes to these debates by considering 
how studies of children’s play might benefit from engaging with new theorisations of 
digital materialities emerging within digital anthropology (Pink et al., 2016; Madianou 
and Miller, 2012). One of the chief characteristics of this anthropologically inspired 
approach is its attempt to avoid the bifurcation of ontology into separate digital and 
material realms. Past attempts have been made to avoid this bifurcation by suggestion 
that the digital and material worlds are mutually shaping –  that digital worlds are 
dependent on a material world (e.g. of hardware and computers) and the digital world 
influences and shapes the material world. However, Pink et al. (2016) argue that such 
attempts to avoid bifurcation still frequently result in re-emphasising the material and 
digital as separate ontologies. In this section we briefly examine some recent 
conceptualisations of children’s play in a smart toy era that have addressed this 
relationship between the material and digital, including notions of ‘connected play’ and 
‘distributed imaginaries’. 
 Originally conceived by Kafai and Fields, the concept of ‘connected play’ seeks 
to capture how connections ‘are at the core of digital playgrounds in the twenty-first 
century’ (2013: 2). Kafai and Fields specifically sought to demonstrate how the 
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affordances of new online play spaces designed for children, such as virtual worlds, gave 
rise to new forms of social and mediated play. More recently, Jackie Marsh (2017) has 
expanded this notion of connected play to explore the way that the Internet of Toys 
(IoToys) creates networks of relationship (1) between children, (2) between children and 
play objects, and (3) between play objects. Marsh also characterises connected play as 
taking place along a physical/virtual continuum, enabling smart toys ‘to cross virtual- and 
physical-world boundaries’ (2017: 2).  
Two further concepts that seek to capture the new digital material ontologies of 
children’s play are Mizuko Ito’s (2005) ‘technologies of the childhood imagination’ and 
Seth Giddings’ (2017) ‘distributed imaginaries’. Focusing on the Yu-Gi-Oh! media 
franchise in Japan in the early 2000s, Ito identified two key trends shaping children’s 
play: first, the arrival of new portable and intimate forms of toys and media that could be 
used anywhere and at any time (including portable games consoles and mobile phones), 
and secondly, the growth of toy franchises that actively encouraged social interaction 
between children such as through trading collectables or taking part in competitive play 
events. Ito describes these toys as spanning ‘multiple materials forms’ (e.g. video games, 
trading cards, toys, television programmes) and as constructing new technological 
imaginaries that pervade children’s lives. Nigel Thrift (2003), also writing in the early 
2000s, describes this as a shift from toys as ‘solitary objects’, to toys as ‘assemblages’ 
that are ‘linked elements of little fantasy worlds’ (395).  
Focusing on the recent Pokémon Go mobile game, Giddings similarly stresses the 
shift towards distributed forms of children’s play across ‘media devices and images, 
physical and virtual artefacts and everyday environmental features’ (2017: 61). He 
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describes how these different elements collectively ‘shape, initiate, sustain, and scaffold 
imaginative play’ (2017: 61). He describes this as a blurring of not only digital and 
material worlds, but also of fantasy and reality. Whilst Ito and Giddings’ notion of 
distributed media assemblages shares much common ground with the idea of connected 
play, it also emphasises how smart toys are located in wider media ecologies, where the 
boundaries between toy, media, and advertisement have become increasingly blurred 
Both the concepts of connected play and distributed assemblages provide useful 
ways of characterising the new digital material formations of children’s play. Particularly 
in their recognition of movements towards more connected and relational practices of 
play. In this paper we seek to further refine these definitions of children’s digital play 
with toys through concepts of ‘digital materiality’ and ‘affordances’. We seek to further 
bridge discussions around smart toys and digital play, with recent conceptual frameworks 
in digital anthropology, media studies and the digital humanities. Our aim is to re-
conceptualise smart toys as media objects (Mascheroni and Holloway, forthcoming) that 
are embedded within broader digital materialities where affordances are relationally 
defined and constituted. Through the notion of affordances, we seek to de-centre the 
smart toy as a ‘solitary object’ and instead to explore how smart toys are implicated in 
processual and relational practices in which child, toy and play culture are co-constituted.   
 
Affordances 
 
For Pink, Ardevol and Lanzeni, digital and material worlds are ‘not separate but 
entangled elements of the same processes, activities and intentionalities’ (2016: 1). Their 
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approach, which draws on a combination of anthropological theory and design theory, 
views digital materialities as emergent within everyday practices (2016: 2). For them, 
‘digital materiality refers to the making and to what emerges […] not [to] a state or 
quality of matter’ (2016: 10). For example, the way the same object may be used and re-
purposed in different contexts. In this respect, digital materiality is about the increasing 
‘porosity’ of the elements that comprise our world that lead to a dynamic and constantly 
shifting ontological landscape. A further characteristic of this digital material ontology is 
its relational approach to media technologies. In this relational perspective, single objects 
are de-centred as their purpose and meaning cannot be severed from wider assemblages. 
Madianou and Miller’s (2012) concept of the ‘polymedia’ environment exemplifies this 
relational co-existence of media technologies, characterised by collective rather than 
discrete ontologies. They describe this ontology as one where: ‘each individual medium 
is defined in relational terms in the context of all other media’ (2012: 170). It is also an 
ontological perspective that shifts emphasis away from the individual affordances of 
media technologies and instead looks towards ‘an environment of affordances’ 
(Madianou and Miller, 2012: 170) in which people, platforms and affordances are 
relationally connected. 
 
First elaborated by Gibson (1979) within ecological psychology and popularised 
by Norman (1988) in design and HCI studies, the notion of affordances – broadly defined 
as the possibilities for agency opened up by a material artefact – has been widely used 
across a range of disciplines as a way to overcome the theoretical impasse between 
technological versus social determinism. It is an analytical tool that accounts for both 
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how technologies shape, without determining, users’ engagement and, vice versa, how 
users make sense of, appropriate, negotiate and even resist technological functionalities 
in their practices. However, notwithstanding, or precisely because of its popularity, 
critiques have lamented that the notion of affordances has been overused and misused, 
and eventually turned into ‘a blunt analytic tool, in need of sharpening’ (Davis and 
Chouinard, 2016: 246). 
Hutchby understands affordances as both functional and relational: ‘functional in 
that they enable (and also constrain) the engagement in some activity; they shape the 
conditions of possibility associated with an action. Relational, in that they may differ for 
one object in different contexts, or between different species’ (Hutchby, 2014: 87). In 
other words, the functional aspect of affordances, as a set of possibilities for action, is 
always socially and culturally situated, and variously actualised through material and 
social contexts. Whilst in Hutchby’s (2001, 2014) definition affordances are recognised 
as the process that mediates between the functionalities of a technological artefact and 
their enactment in situated social practices, its relational and processual nature is often 
overlooked by others and reduced to one of the two poles of the interaction as shown by 
Evans et al. (2017). In their analysis of multidisciplinary articles which adopted an 
affordances perspective, Evans et al. identified inconsistencies in the use of the term and 
pointed to theoretical and methodological flaws which conflate affordances with either 
technological features or the outcomes of the human and technology interaction. 
Moreover, they emphasise the variability of affordances: rather than being binary features 
that a technology may possess or not, affordances are ‘a relational link among the object, 
user and outcome’ (Evans et al., 2017: 40) that necessarily operate through gradations. 
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Davis and Chouinard explain how affordances operate ‘at the intersection of artifacts, 
actors, and situations’ (2016: 245) through requests or demands, and by allowing, 
encouraging, discouraging or refusing users’ practices. Requests guide and orient users’ 
engagement with the artefact towards certain outcomes. Affordances as demands have a 
more binding and constraining effect, since they set the circumstances that condition the 
use of an artefact. While demands and requests push users, the mechanisms of 
encouraging, discouraging, refusing and allowing refer to the object’s responses to 
processes of social shaping, that is to users’ negotiations of the possibilities for agency 
opened by an object. Artefacts vary in the degrees in which they allow certain lines of 
action on the part of the user, or, instead, force lines of action. The diverse mechanisms, 
though, are conceptually related – that is, they take on meaning in relation to one another 
(Davis and Chouinard, 2016: 244). Affordances as processual and relational, Davis and 
Chouinard argue, are also always contingent and situated in the specific interaction 
between one user and the artefact: ‘how artifacts request, demand, allow, encourage, 
discourage, and refuse is always relative to the subjects who engage said artifacts, and the 
structural position in which the subject-artifact relationships are embedded’ (Davis and 
Chouinard, 2016: 246). 
However, many studies fail to capture the contingent and situated nature of 
affordances and adopt the term only to describe ‘situated patterns of usage’ as if they 
were inherent and universal properties of a technology (Costa, 2018: 3), overlooking the 
ethnographic variety of uses-in-context. According to Costa (2018), this shortcoming 
characterises much contemporary research on social media, in that it assumes the 
affordances of platforms are separated from their social context of origin, and that 
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therefore they are universally valid. Costa gives the example of how the concept of 
‘context collapse’ on social media (the overlapping of previously distinct social 
networks) is a Western rather than universal affordance of Facebook and similar 
platforms. Costa frames affordances as a socio-technical achievement susceptible to 
variations across space and time and argues for a focus on affordances-in-practice: ‘the 
enactment of platform properties by specific users within social and cultural contexts’ 
(2018: 11). Affordances are the result of countless, reiterated human and technology 
interaction (Costa, 2018; Vincent, 2015) and, are therefore, potentially durable. Socially 
and culturally situated, affordances sediment in social practices, materialities and time. 
They hinge on processes of social legitimation through which they are rendered socially 
acceptable, desirable and even normative (Mascheroni & Vincent, 2016).  
We believe that a definition of affordances as relational, processual, and therefore 
contingent and variously actualised in practice, would help overcome the duality of 
objects and subjects (Costa, 2018) and the duality between the digital and the material 
(Pink et al., 2016) alike. This will enable us to think of the affordances of smart toys as 
shaped in constantly unfolding relationships between toy and child, and to explore the 
continuity and discontinuity of affordances across changing iterations of care toys. The 
following section explores how this approach might be realised in practice in the context 
of smart toys, demonstrating how affordances emerge through digital-material play. 
Drawing on literature on affordances from across a diverse range of fields, these sections 
seek to develop new forms of conceptual language for articulating the affordances of 
smart toys. The affordances described below are intended to be indicative rather than 
comprehensive, and primarily aim to demonstrate the potential of an approach to smart 
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toys that is attentive to the wider cross-disciplinary landscape of affordances research. 
Our examples are also intended to show the synergies between discussions in smart toys 
and other areas of research – demonstrating that affordances are not specific to objects 
but rather emerge in broader landscape of smart robotic and media technologies.  
    
The Affordances of Smart Care Toys 
In this section we reflect on three affordances of smart care toys: their liveliness, 
affective stickiness and portability. We consider how engagement with wider theoretical 
scholarship in media studies, STS and HCI might help us to make sense of these 
affordances, and provide examples of what analysis of these affordances might look like 
in practice using data from different studies.  
 
Liveliness 
The first affordance of smart toys we consider is liveliness. Since the 18th century 
‘automata’ and other mechanical toys have often been characterised by their ability to 
seem to simulate life without apparent human control (Peppe, 2002). Smart toy 
manufacturers have built on this legacy, using animatronic technology to create pets 
(based on real and imaginary creatures) that appear to act autonomously and 
independently of their user (Bloch and Lemish, 1999; Turkle, 2006; Marsh, 2017). Smart 
care toys like Hasbro’s Furby and Spin Master’s Hatchimals use animatronic technology 
to perform sounds and movements that encourage children to treat their toy as a ‘living’ 
object to be played with and cared for.  
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As discussed in the previous section, affordances are relational and processual in 
character – involving constant work between the toy and user. This is particularly 
apparent in the case of liveliness which is dependent on a child’s willingness and desire 
to explore and test the boundaries of the toy as an in/animate object. Though many smart 
toy manufacturers seek to convey a sense of animation and liveliness in their care toys, 
through design features such as bodily movement, facial expressions and vocal sounds, 
we contend that liveliness is not solely a product of design, but rather is contingent on 
children’s imaginative explorations of subject/object boundaries. In STS and HCI, the 
liveliness of technology has often been explored as a feature of human-machine 
relationships, particularly robots and other animatronic technologies (Haraway, 1997). In 
this section we draw on recent discussions of human-robot relationships (Suchman, 2011; 
Zhao, 2006) to reflect on how ‘liveliness’ emerges as a relational affordance between 
children and animatronic care toys.  
For Shanyang Zhao (2006), behaving in a ‘human-like way’ has become an 
important benchmark for social robots of all types. For social robots to be successful at 
forming relationships and engaging in meaningful interactions with humans, they must 
draw attention away from their artificiality. This is epitomised in computer science by the 
Turing Test whose benchmark for a successful robot is whether it can convincingly pass 
as a human. Whilst the trend in robotics has been to create convincing ‘humanoid’ 
machines, smart care toys have rarely attempted to resemble humans or other animals. 
Most assume the form of ‘cute’ creatures that bear only a passing resemblance to real 
animals (e.g. the Furby is described as owl-like). Their liveliness instead emerges 
through, what Turkle describes, as an ‘evocation of life’ (2006) – an imitation of life-like 
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speech and movement that invites children to imagine and treat a toy as a living object. 
Researching children’s interactions with computers in the 1980s, Turkle noted the way 
that children would consider computers ‘alive’ if they appeared to display intelligence or 
autonomous thought. Reflecting on the changing role of technology in children’s lives 
some thirty years later, Turkle notes how the smart toy has marked a shift in how children 
evaluate the liveliness of a machine. Rather than assessing computers based on 
intelligence, children have instead begun to assess whether their computer toys feel and 
can convey convincing emotional expression.  
 Both Zhao and Turkle provide important ways of situating children’s smart care 
toys in debates about social robots and the growth of interest in making machine’s ‘life-
like’. However, how is liveliness relationally achieved as an affordance between children 
and smart care toys? Whilst a smart care toy can possess an array of ‘life-like’ features, 
we need to look to the social-material relationships between children and smart toys to 
understand how this affordance is achieved in practice. Lucy Suchman’s (2013) work on 
human-robot relationships, from a feminist STS perspective, provides one possible 
framework. Suchman describes the encounters between humans and robots as ‘entity-
making practices’ in which boundaries between subject/object and sameness/difference 
are relationally negotiated. Drawing on Donna Haraway’s concept of ‘becoming with’, 
she describes how the material entanglements of humans and robots involve 
‘configurations [that] differently corporealize the bodies of persons and robots through 
their embedding in particular spaces, stories and intra-active encounters’ (2011: 133). For 
Suchman, humans and robots are co-shaping of liveliness. The human enlivens the robot 
through interactions (e.g. talk or play) – causing the robot to perform liveliness. In turn 
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the robot, through its life-like features and action, will provoke the human to test its 
liveliness.    
Liveliness, then, can be seen as co-realised by child and toy, with each animating 
and enlivening the other through their interactions. The robot invites, incites and 
‘encourages’ (Davis and Chouinard, 2016) the child to recognise its sociality, often 
through calls (vocally, but also through gestures) to play. The child in turn engages in 
play practices that test the robot’s liveliness – configured and mediated through the 
child’s own sense of what an animate object can and should be.  
Children’s testing of the liveliness of robot toys are evident in several research 
encounters. 7-year-old Saffron1, for example, experiments with her Furby to push the 
robot toy’s ‘life’ to its limits. Saffron responds to the Furby’s repeated calls for food by 
engaging in feeding practices that she knows will cause the Furby to lose its teeth:  
Saffron: If he gets a boiled egg his teeth will come out, see. 
Or to be sick and poo: 
Saffron: Now he’s going to the loo, I wanna see if he does some poos, he did it. 
Saffron engages in co-producing the liveliness of the Furby through playing with its life-
like features (of feeding, losing teeth, toileting), but she also tests the boundaries of the 
robot toy’s liveliness by repeatedly forcing it to demonstrate its life-like features on 
demand. Whilst the Furby dutifully demonstrates its qualities as a living object, Saffron’s 
                                                 
1 In an interview in Thomson, Berriman & Bragg (2018), Saffron identified a Furby as one of several 
objects important in her play, which also included a large container of Moshi Monster figurines and a 
collection of teddies and dolls.   
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experiments – and her predictions of how it will respond – underline the way that she is 
able to tease out and assert the limits of the ‘life’ of the object.  
Jackie Marsh’s (forthcoming) analysis of two children’s reactions to the ‘life-like’ 
features of Furbies similarly underlines how the liveliness of smart care toys is 
configured through practices of differentiating human-like from non-human. Marsh 
describes how Amy, who is two years and eleven months old, treats the liveliness of the 
Furby as an invitation for playful interaction in ways analogous to Saffron. Supervised by 
her mother, she experiments with feeding the Furby different items, working out what it 
likes and what makes it sick. Amy and her mother also address the Furby with masculine 
pronouns, referring to the toy as ‘he’. In another research encounter, Marsh describes 
meeting Angela, aged two years and two months, and her parents. Rather than seeing the 
Furby’s liveliness as inviting play, Angela and her parents find the toy to be a source of 
‘unease’ and ‘anxiety’ – with its rolling eyes and strange noises read as ‘creepy’. Due to 
Angela’s fear of the toy, they eventually sell it.  
Marsh characterises these two different reactions to the Furby as 
‘anthropomorphic’ and ‘uncanny’. The anthropomorphic encounter is one in which the 
robot toy’s liveliness is recognised as human-like in quality. The uncanny encounter, 
however, is one in which the liveliness of the robot toy is read as ‘simultaneously familiar 
and alienating’ (forthcoming: 7). However, rather than treat these as two distinct 
classifications of a robot’s perceived liveliness, we might instead read them as diametric 
points along a continuum of children’s negotiation of subject/object and human/non-
human boundaries. As Suchman describes, ‘[the] robot sits provocatively on the 
boundary of subjects and objects, threatening its breakdown at the same time that it 
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reiterates its founding identities and differences’ (2011: 133). In Saffron’s case, we can 
observe the slipperiness of the subject/object boundary. Whilst her interactions with the 
Furby invest it with anthropomorphic qualities (he can “sleep”, “poo”, “eat”), she 
simultaneously recognises it as an uncanny object which exhibits machine-like reliability 
or ‘calculability’ (Bloch and Lemish 1999) in response to her demands for it to perform. 
Here we can see how this boundary making practice involves a constant process of 
mutual becoming (Haraway, 2008) in which the Furby’s liveliness is repeatedly evaluated 
as Saffron’s familiarity with the range and limits of that liveliness grows.    
To what extent is this liveliness an affordance exclusive to robots and smart toys? 
And does liveliness have historical precedence in the affordances of more traditional 
toys? On the one hand, liveliness can potentially be attributed as an affordance of any 
human-object relationships where boundaries between subject/object are challenged. 
Toys have particularly been imagined and played with as animate objects (Kuznets 1994) 
even without the capacity to autonomously move, speak or respond. In this respect, we 
can look to relationships with more traditional toys – such as dolls, action figures and 
teddy bears – as a way of exploring how liveliness is configured in different material 
assemblages of child and toy over time. However, the particular life-like performances of 
smart care toys, and other robot toys, are nonetheless important and distinctive in the 
production of the liveliness of the smart toy. As we describe in the next section, these 
functions are often designed to give smart toys new forms of agency that ‘demand’ rather 
than ‘request’ children’s interaction (Davis and Chouinard, 2016).  
 
Affective Stickiness 
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Another affordance that is a characteristic of smart care toys is what we call ‘affective 
stickiness’. The concept was originally developed by feminist media researchers Jette 
Kofoed and Jessica Ringrose (2012) in their interpretation of cyberbullying. Drawing on 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), they understand affects to be the products of encounters 
which entail processes of mutual positioning and subjectification. Here, we adopt and 
adapt an affective view to describe how the affordances of smart care toys can be 
understood as relational affective processes which glue certain affects to certain 
inanimate (the toy) and animate (children) bodies. In other words, we claim that affective 
assemblages emerge from the interactions between children and smart toys, which re-
position and re-configure distinctions between the material and the immaterial, the digital 
and non-digital, inanimate and animate as blurred and indistinct. Within the entanglement 
of the digital and the material typical of smart toys, children become emotionally attached 
to their toys in profound and novel ways. 
We find Kofoed and Ringrose’s analogy of stickiness useful in two respects. First, 
their description of how affects cling and ‘stick’ to bodies over time chimes with our 
understanding of affordances as sedimented through the ongoing interactions of humans 
and technology (Costa, 2018; Vincent, 2015). In this respect, affordances can become 
habitual and ingrained so long as the relationship between human and technology is 
maintained. Secondly, and more closely connected to our interest in smart care toys, 
repeated interactions can lead children to form emotional attachments with their toys 
(Kahn et al., 2006) and therefore one of the affordances of these objects is their ‘affective 
stickiness’.  
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One could argue, though, that the affordance of affective stickiness is not peculiar 
to smart toys. Indeed, children also personify and project emotional qualities onto their 
stuffed pets and dolls. However, what is novel here, and what configures affective 
stickiness as an affordance, is the mechanism through which smart toys ‘demand’ (Davis 
and Chouinard, 2016), rather than simply ‘allowing’ or ‘encouraging’, an emotional 
attachment. Robotic pets and dolls are ‘affective’ social robots ‘designed to interact with 
humans on an emotional level’ (Zhao, 2006: 408). In other words, emotions have been 
engineered into these robots to evoke users’ responsiveness (Vincent, 2015). These toys 
simulate human interaction and trigger particular emotional responses in the user, who 
feel a desire or urge to take care of them. This compulsion to nurturing and meeting the 
demands of the toy is what according to Turkle (2006) distinguishes ‘relational artefacts’ 
like social robots from ‘transitional artefacts’ such as stuffed pets and dolls, and 
configures a new relational encounter. Traditional transitional objects allow children to 
project meanings – the desire to be fed, cleaned, in a word nurtured – onto the pet or doll 
and thus develop an emotional bond to such objects. By contrast, relational artefacts are 
‘decidedly more active’, as Turkle (2006) puts it, or demand care – as we would put it – 
by signalling their needs through various forms of notification – sounds, words, 
movements of the eyes and body, etc. ‘In the move from traditional transitional objects to 
contemporary relation artefacts, projection gives way to engagement’ (Turkle, 2006). 
While projection is led by the child, engagement appears to be oriented and pushed by the 
technology. By this, we do not mean that the interaction, and the associated relational 
affects, is totally controlled by the toy’s affordances. That is, we are not suggesting that 
smart toys determine children’s playful practices. Even demands (Davis and Chouinard, 
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2016) take shape only through interaction, but resisting and rebuffing such demands 
implies ending, at least temporarily, the interaction. We draw on our empirical evidence 
around the Tamagotchi and the Furby to illustrate this point further. 
The Tamagotchi is emblematic of how an affective, compelling relationship is 
formed, between the child and a toy that eventually dies if its demands are not met – that 
is, when children fail to provide them with ‘virtual care, when necessary, in the form of 
sleep, a regular supply of food and drink, washing, play, teaching, scolding and 
medication’ (Bloch and Lemish, 1999: 284). Fourteen-year-old Aliyah2 well describes 
how the requirements of the Tamagotchi were binding and even mandatory, if one 
wanted to keep the Tamagotchi alive and grow into an adult: 
 
Aliyah: My Tamagotchi died. But basically, there was, you had to be kind of responsible, 
I think there was like this, you had to be responsible, you had to like look after this 
animal, and you had to give it food and stuff like that and it would die if you never took 
care of it, and then mine died. 
 
By saying that users needed to behave in a responsible way and take care of the 
Tamagotchi, Aliyah does not only capture what was the perceived educational value of 
Tamagotchi as sanctioned by parents – namely, ‘teaching responsibility’ (Bloch and 
Lemish, 1999: 286). She also points to the way the Tamagotchi pushed users towards a 
moral responsiveness. The insistent beeping of the Tamagotchi, recalling the user to 
                                                 
2 In Thomson, Berriman & Bragg (2018), Aliyah selected her Tamagotchi as an object that was 
representative of her past, which she had kept in a memory box despite it having been broken for several 
years. She selected her mobile phone as a favorite object in the present.  
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her/his nurturing responsibilities, can be argued to project upon the child the subject 
position of the mother responsibilised as ‘the self-for-others’ (Johnson, 2014). Moreover, 
these intermittent yet continuous notifications, by tethering children to the demands of 
the affective social robot, produce another subject position that is usually associated with 
the affordances of mobile communication – and namely the affordance of ‘perpetual 
contact’ (Mascheroni & Vincent, 2016) – and that Turkle (2008) names the ‘tethered 
self’. Affective stickiness as an affordance includes the binding force of ‘anywhere, 
anytime’ availability of mobile communication, especially of instant messaging 
applications such as WhatsApp. Especially notifications on WhatsApp that indicate when 
the receiver has received and read the message, push children and teenagers to respond in 
real time for fear of missing out and failing to conform to reciprocal expectations and 
social norms that govern interactions within the peer group (Mascheroni & Vincent, 
2016). Similarly, the interview with seven-year-old Saffron well illustrates the ‘always 
on’ dimension of affective social robots: prompted by the researcher to pick her favourite 
toy at the beginning of the interview, she interacts with her Furby for while – ‘wakes him 
up’, ‘feed him with some grapes’ etc. As the conversation with the researcher continues, 
she talks about other toys, especially her Barbies, but the Furby demands constant 
attention by playing various sounds. At some point, Saffron notes: 
 
Saffron: The Furby’s asleep now. 
Researcher: Furby’s asleep, he is asleep isn’t he? 
Saffron: A huh.  ‘Cause he gets tired and for a few minutes and then he goes to 
sleep. 
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The Furby goes into a sleep mode but ‘wakes up’ again after a while and starts giving off 
noisy signals again. The constant attachment that Furby and Tamagotchi demand is no 
different from the emotional attachment that users develop in relation to their 
smartphones in that it elicits ‘electronic emotions’ (Vincent and Fortunati, 2009), that is 
emotions created and lived through interacting with machines. The outcome of such 
reiterated emotional interactions is a relationship in which the technological artefact 
becomes natural and, in the case of the mobile phone, also a taken for granted and 
socially legitimised always-on presence (Mascheroni & Vincent, 2016; Vincent, 2015).  
The comparison with the affordances of mobile communication through the 
notion of electronic emotions leads us to untangle another mechanism through which 
affective stickiness operates as an affordance. Beyond demanding nurturing and care, 
affective social robots such as Tamagotchi and Furby also ‘allow’ (Davis and Chouinard, 
2016) for electronic emotions prompted as a result not only of the reiterated interactions 
with the devices, but also of the reiterated mediated interactions with intimate others 
through such a device. The device, then, becomes the repository of personal memories 
and affects. Aliyah well explains how the Tamagotchi is still carefully conserved in her 
memory box since it embodies the relationships with her primary school friends: 
 
Aliyah: Hmm, it reminds, I would say it reminds me of my old friends, like since we 
moved here I haven’t talked to any of them, so I would say my old friends from where we 
lived before, so yeah, I’d say that. 
25 
 
 
This is consistent with the understanding that affordances demand and require but also 
allow, encourage, discourage and resist. Aliyah’s words, however, also lead us into the 
final affordance of smart toys that we would like to address in this paper, that is, its 
portability. 
 
Portability 
The last affordance of smart care toys that we address is their material and symbolic 
portability. The miniaturization of smart care toys – of the Tamagotchi for example – is 
associated with its affective stickiness: ‘the fact that the Tamgotchi is a miniaturized toy 
and can therefore be easily held and transported seems to be of great importance in its 
ability to elicit feelings of affection’ (Bloch and Lemish, 1999: 289). Being so small that 
it can be held, carried around and attached to the body ‘encourages’ (Davis and 
Chouinard, 2016) the practice of nurturing and, hence, the development of a sense of 
intimacy with a virtual pet and an emotional bonding to the material artefact.  
However, we would like to focus here on the portability of smart care toys in a 
more genuinely social sense: as tools for children to negotiate group boundaries and 
belonging. Bloch and Lemish have previously noted that children would physically 
gather around Tamagotchis at school to compare their caretaking behavior, but also to 
sanction their belonging to a group on the basis of being ‘socially attuned to and with 
access to current trends’ (1999: 290). Interactions with peers through smart care toys 
becomes part of the wider meaning-making processes through which children construct, 
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negotiate and legitimate their belonging to peer groups. Sociologist Allison Pugh 
described the outcome of such peer interactions around material culture an ‘economy of 
dignity’: ‘children collect or confer dignity among themselves, according to their 
(shifting) consensus about what sort of objects or experiences are supposed to count for 
it’ (Pugh, 2009: 7). Aliyah’s account of the place of the Tamagotchi in her life as a seven-
year-old epitomises the practices through which artefacts and experiences are 
transformed by children and re-invented as ‘symbolic tokens to vie for dignity’ (Pugh, 
2009: 218). Aliyah wanted a Tamagotchi for her birthday to claim dignity and confirm 
her belonging to the group: ‘at the time there was, everyone had it and it was really like a 
big thing, and if you didn’t have it was kind of weird so’. She also describes the symbolic 
labour around the Tamagotchi – that is, how the material portability of the Tamagotchi 
allowed for its re-use in competitive status seeking behaviour:  
Aliyah: Yeah (laughs). To be honest it was like, everyone would get it to show off, how it 
told you how good your life is and stuff like that, and then, obviously, mine wasn’t really 
good because mine died, but everyone else’s was like, really high and every one would 
get it in to show off how long it would last for. 
Whilst the Tamagotchi represented seven-year-old Aliyah’s favourite object, the 
smartphone is the material object which fourteen-year-old Aliyah is most attached. This 
is no coincidence, as the engagement with both the materiality and the symbolic value of 
the Tamagotchi has also been observed in the literature on mobile communications and 
children. One relevant point emerging from the field of mobile communication is that 
material and symbolic portability are mutually constitutive. Indeed, the multi-
dimensional portability of mobile phones – as a three-way process involving the mobility 
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of the user, the mobility of the device and the mobility of the content (Cooper, 2002) –
sets the conditions for the socially situated meaning-making practices through which 
teens negotiate their belonging. The mobile phone has been used as a significant 
repository of personal information and an identity-making device (Caron & Caronia, 
2007: 105) through which teens claim dignity and status within the peer group. In using 
the mobile phone as symbolic resource for identity formation in the context of face-to-
face interaction, teens re-signify the model of the phone, its decoration with cute cultural 
icons, the mobile phone address book – especially the number and status of the 
individuals in the list – as well as the history of text messages and their call logs into 
markers of status and identity (Green and Haddon, 2009; Ling, 2004). This is not 
dissimilar to how the material and digital Tamagotchi was converted into a symbolic 
token to ‘show off’ and claim the dignity to participate in the group on an equal footing. 
So, identity and belonging are a fundamental outcome of portability as an affordance. 
Ito also elaborates on the creative use of toys in the setting of everyday social 
interactions and suggests a second level at which the material and symbolic portability of 
smart care toys plays out and unfolds as part of the wider media mix that characterises 
contemporary peer cultures. She emphasises the hypersociality of contemporary popular 
culture, to describe both how sociality is augmented by complex networks of ‘peer-to-
peer ecologies of cultural production and exchange’ (Ito, 2005: 3) and how everyday 
imagination around popular culture artefacts is a site of generative cultural production. 
Imagination as a social activity has been expanded thanks to the pervasiveness of 
‘portable and intimate technologies’ of play (Ito, 2005: 1-2).  
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We could refer to this second outcome of portability as ‘distributed imagination’ 
(Giddings, 2017), to describe the way in which children’s imagined worlds are emergent 
and co-created as socio-technical achievements (Giddings, 2017: 60). Giddings 
emphasises the social dimension of affordances that are always located within socio-
technical assemblages or, in other words, digital materialities.  
 
Conclusion 
In this final section we reflect on how concepts of digital materiality and affordances 
contribute to new understandings of children’s play in an era of smart toys. 
One question raised at the beginning of this paper is how the digital material 
transformation of toys has remediated (Bolter and Grusin, 1999) the ontological status of 
toys and its affordances. In other words, are there tangible distinctions between more 
traditional toys (e.g. soft toys and dolls) and smart toys? Our analysis suggests that whilst 
new smart toys do share some affordances with traditional toys – for example, in the way 
they invite imaginative play, practices of care, and affection – these have been augmented 
by the new sets of affordances that bear closer resemblance to mobile media (portability, 
affective stickiness) and robotics (liveliness). This augmentation of the affordances of 
toys has led to a shift in the dynamics between child and toy in which play practices that 
were previously ‘requested’ or ‘encouraged’ are now ‘demanded’ (Davis and Chouinard, 
2017). Consequently, we suggest that combining new concepts of digital materiality and 
affordances can contribute to understanding the continuities and discontinuities of what 
counts as a toy. In studying the affordances of smart care toys, we suggest there is value 
in locating these and other smart toys within the shared ‘environment of affordances’ 
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(Madianou and Miller 2012) of other mobile media and technologies. We propose that 
this presents new opportunities for treating the smart toy as a hybrid object, which 
transcends traditional boundaries between toy and media and whose affordances can 
increasingly be traced within the emerging digital materialities of media technologies. 
Conceptually, this paper has demonstrated the value of a relational and processual 
notion of affordances in the study of smart toys. This has enabled us to de-centre both the 
child (Spyrou 2017) and the smart toy (Costa 2017; Pink et al. 2016) to focus on the 
mediatory work of affordances within the context of digital play. We have reflected on 
how affordances are relationally “actualized and enacted” (Costa 2017) between children 
and smart toys, but also how affordances mediate the parameters of action and agency. 
This has enabled us to see how child and toy become enmeshed in relational practices of 
co-becoming (Haraway 2008) where each act on the other in a “shifting choreography of 
[…] lively objects and obliging subject” (Suchman 2011: 129) mediated by affordances. 
We propose that attention to affordances can provide the field of children’s toy and media 
cultures with crucial insights into the relational and processual configuration of children’s 
digital material play. 
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1 These examples are drawn from a qualitative longitudinal study (2013-14) on time and technology in 
children’s everyday lives (see Thomson, Berriman & Bragg 2018). The study used a range of qualitative 
longitudinal, digital and multimodal methods to study children’s lives across different temporalities 
(intensive and extensive rhythms) and spaces (home/school, public/private). Throughout the study, a central 
focus was the role of digital technology in mediating children’s everyday experiences, including toys and 
domestic media devices. The study’s sample comprised two groups of children: six aged 7-8 years who had 
previously participated with their families in a longitudinal study of motherhood (2005-10), and eight aged 
10-15 years who were newly recruited for the Everyday Childhoods study 
